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Abstract
Most human behaviors consist of multiple parts,
steps, or subtasks. These structures guide our ac-
tion planning and execution, but when we observe
others, the latent structure of their actions is typ-
ically unobservable, and must be inferred in order
to learn new skills by demonstration, or to as-
sist others in completing their tasks. For example,
an assistant who has learned the subgoal struc-
ture of a colleague’s task can more rapidly rec-
ognize and support their actions as they unfold.
Here we model how humans infer subgoals from
observations of complex action sequences using
a nonparametric Bayesian model, which assumes
that observed actions are generated by approxi-
mately rational planning over unknown subgoal
sequences. We test this model with a behavioral
experiment in which humans observed different se-
ries of goal-directed actions, and inferred both the
number and composition of the subgoal sequences
associated with each goal. The Bayesian model
predicts human subgoal inferences with high ac-
curacy, and significantly better than several al-
ternative models and straightforward heuristics.
Motivated by this result, we simulate how learn-
ing and inference of subgoals can improve perfor-
mance in an artificial user assistance task. The
Bayesian model learns the correct subgoals from
fewer observations, and better assists users by
more rapidly and accurately inferring the goal of
their actions than alternative approaches.
Introduction
Human behavior is hierarchically structured. Even sim-
ple actions – checking email, for example – consist of
many steps, which span levels of description and com-
plexity: moving fingers, arms, eyes; choosing whether
to use the mouse or keyboard; searching for the email
app among the others that are open, etc. Human be-
havior is also efficient: we attempt to perform each part
of each action as swiftly and successfully as we can, at
the least possible cost.
Classical models of how humans understand the ac-
tions of others (originating from the plan recognition
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literature (Schank and Abelson 1977; Kautz and Allen
1986; Charniak and Goldman 1993; Bui, Venkatesh, and
West 2002)) seek to leverage this hierarchical structure
by building in prior knowledge of others’ high-level ac-
tions, tasks, and goals. Behavioral evidence has shown
that adults and even infants can learn simple hierarchi-
cal action structures from data, segmenting novel se-
quences along statistical action boundaries (Baldwin et
al. 2008). These abilities can be captured with a non-
parametric action segmentation model (Buchsbaum et
al. 2015), which learns lists of actions that occur in se-
quence, and potentially cause observable effects.
However, purely statistical learning from data leaves
implicit the intrinsic efficiency of intentional actions.
For adults and infants, the assumption that others’
actions are rational functions of their beliefs, desires,
and goals is fundamental (Dennett 1987; Gergely et al.
1995). Rather than simply memorizing repeated action
sequences, people infer goals of complexity sufficient to
rationalize these actions (Schachner and Carey 2013).
A simple formalization of people’s theory of rational,
goal-directed action can be given in terms of approxi-
mately rational planning in Markov decision processes
(MDPs), and human goal inferences can be accurately
predicted using Bayesian inference over models of MDP
planning (or inverse planning) (Baker, Saxe, and Tenen-
baum 2009). This approach is closely related to recent
plan recognition algorithms developed in the AI litera-
ture (Ramı´rez and Geffner 2010, e.g.).
In this paper, we integrate hierarchically structured
actions into the inverse planning framework using hier-
archical MDPs (Sutton, Precup, and Singh 1999). We
consider scenarios in which agents pursue sequences of
subgoals enroute to various destinations. Each destina-
tion can have multiple subgoal sequences, generated by
a nonparametric Bayesian model. Together, a destina-
tion and subgoal sequence induce a hierarchical MDP,
and agents’ actions are assumed to be generated by ap-
proximately rational planning in this MDP.
Representing agents’ subgoal-based plans allows seg-
mentation of behavior into extended chunks, separated
by sparse subgoal boundaries, and can achieve greater
generalization than purely statistical models by natu-
rally capturing the context-sensitivity of rational action
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sequences, rather than having to learn new sequences
for each context. Further, the model predicts deviations
from rationality (with respect to a single subgoal) at
subgoal boundaries – a strong cue to hierarchical struc-
ture. This inductive bias should enable efficient learning
of subgoal structure from small numbers of examples.
We present two experiments to test our model. The
first is a behavioral experiment, in which human partic-
ipants inferred the subgoal structure underlying series
of action sequences. The second experiment is a simula-
tion to show that the model is useful in an artificial user
support task. The model first learns the subgoal struc-
ture of the task from a small number of observations.
Then, the model infers a user’s destination and subgoals
from a partial action sequence, and attempts to assist
the user to achieve a subset of the remaining subgoals.
For each experiment, we compare the performance of
our model with that of several natural alternatives.
Computational Model
Fig. 1 represents the structure of our model in terms of
separate graphical models for the hierarchical MDP and
nonparametric subgoal models. These graphical mod-
els specify the structure of the joint distributions over
actions, state sequences, and subgoal sequences. Our
model represents the situational context in terms of a
finite state space S. The variable s denotes a state se-
quence of length T , such that st ∈ S is the tth state in
the sequence. The variable g represents a sequence of
M subgoals. We denote the mth subgoal of g as gm ∈ S.
For convenience, we assume that sT = gM = d is the
destination. We denote the set of actions as A, and the
action executed in st as at ∈ A (see Fig. 1(a)).
The remainder of this section will first define the hier-
archical MDP induced by a given destination and sub-
goal sequence, and derive the likelihood of a subgoal
sequence, given an observed state sequence. Then we
describe the nonparametric model of subgoal sequences,
and a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method for
jointly inferring the number and composition of the sub-
goal sequences underlying a series of action sequences.
Finally, we show how to use subgoal sequences learned
from previous observations to predict the subgoals and
destination of a novel partial action sequence.
Subgoal sequence likelihood
Our hierarchical MDP formulation is closely related to
the options framework for hierarchical reinforcement
learning (Sutton, Precup, and Singh 1999). For simplic-
ity, we assume that actions and state transitions are de-
terministic, that each action incurs a cost of 2, that the
discount factor γ = 1.0, and that the destination yields
a reward of 100 once all subgoals have been achieved.
The subgoal sequence g is analogous to a set of op-
tions, with initiation and termination conditions that
require each subgoal to be achieved in sequential or-
der. In Fig. 1(a), the variable g˜t keeps track of the cur-
rent subgoal at time t. Assume the current subgoal is
(a) Hierarchical MDP
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(b) Subgoal DP
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Figure 1: Graphical models for our framework. (a) Hi-
erarchical MDP planning model of state sequences.
Agents select actions according to a probabilistic pol-
icy in the hierarchical MDP defined by the subgoal se-
quence g. β is a parameter for soft-max action selection.
(b) The Bayesian nonparametric subgoal model takes
the form of a Dirichlet process (DP), in which each ac-
tion sequence depends on a goal sequence sampled from
a DP with concentration parameter α.
g˜t = gm; if the agent reaches the current subgoal, i.e.,
st = g˜t, then g˜t+1 ← gm+1 should be the next subgoal,
otherwise the subgoal should stay the same (g˜t+1 ← g˜t).
Based on this, an observed sequence s can be di-
vided into multiple segments corresponding to g. We
define boundary bm to be the first timestep t after
gm−1 is achieved: bm = min({t|st−1 = gm ∧ t > bj−1});
b0 = 1. We write the boundary vector b = 〈b0, b1, ...〉.
If s achieves all subgoals in g in order, the length of
b, dim(b) should be dim(g) + 1. Otherwise, s does not
satisfy g, so P (s|g) should be 0. The subgoal sequence
likelihood is then:
P (s|g) =

dim(g)∏
m=1
bm−1∏
t=bm−1
P (st+1|st, gm);
(if dim(b) = dim(g) + 1)
0; (otherwise),
(1)
where P (st+1|st, gm) =
∑
at∈A
P (st+1|st, at)P (at|st, gm)
is the marginal probability of the state transition from
st to st+1, integrating over actions. P (at|st, gm) ∝
exp(βQgm(st, at)) is a softmax policy of the local MDP
state-action value function for subgoal gm, based on
the assumption that the observed agent plans approx-
imately rationally, stochastically maximizing expected
reward and minimizing cost.
A similar likelihood computation was used by (Mi-
chini, Cutler, and How 2013) within an MCMC method
for inferring subgoal sequences from user demonstra-
tions. However, this approach focused on learning only
one subgoal sequence from one action sequence; in the
next section, we describe a nonparametric Bayesian
model and MCMC methods for inferring multiple sub-
goal sequences, given a series of state sequences.
Nonparametric subgoal inference
We now consider inference of subgoal structure by ob-
serving multiple sequences for a certain destination. We
denote the set of N behavior sequences as s1:N and the
ith sequence as si. We denote a set of K subgoal se-
quences as g1:K , and the kth sequence as gk. The prob-
lem of nonparametric subgoal inference is to compute
P (g1:K |s1:N ) for an unbounded number of sequencesK.
We model the set of unknown subgoal sequences us-
ing a nonparametric Bayesian model, which allows us
to consider an unbounded number of subgoal sequences
for each destination. We use the Dirichlet process (DP)
to express the distribution over subgoal sequences, fol-
lowing (Buchsbaum et al. 2015). A graphical model of
our DP model is shown in Fig. 1(b). We use the Chinese
Restaurant Process (CRP) representation to efficiently
draw samples from the DP. First, the CRP selects a “ta-
ble” for each observation si, conditioned on all previous
table assignments and the concentration parameter α0.
zi is the index of the table assigned to state sequence
si. Next, for each CRP table, a subgoal sequence is
sampled from the base distribution P0, and gk denotes
the subgoal sequence associated with the kth table. The
state sequence si is then generated given its associated
subgoal sequence.
We use a MCMC method to compute the posterior
probability over subgoal sequences, specifically, Gibbs
sampling. Gibbs sampling allows us to approximate the
complex DP distribution by inducing a Markov chain
over samples from the CRP. Gibbs sampling over the
CRP is a standard MCMC algorithm for DP infer-
ence (Neal 2000). Algorithm 1 is an overview of our
algorithm. As an initialization step, we assign a differ-
ent table for each state sequence, and draw subgoal se-
quences from the conditional distribution over subgoal
sequences given the state sequence assigned to each ta-
ble. We then repeat the table re-assignment step (re-
sampling the table for each state sequence) and the
parameter re-assignment step (drawing the subgoal se-
quences from the conditional distribution over subgoal
sequences, given all sequences assigned to a table). For
the table re-assignment step, we calculate the probabil-
ity P (zi = k|z−i, si) to assign sequence si to table k
according to standard Gibbs sampling for the CRP:
P (zi = k|z−i, si) =
n−i,k
N − 1 + αP (si|gk)
(If k = zj for some i 6= j)
α
N − 1 + α
∫
P (si|g)P0(g)dg
(If k 6= zj for all i 6= j),
(2)
where z−i denotes table assignments, excluding se-
quence i, and n−i,k denotes the number of sequences
assigned to table k, excluding sequence i.
However, for our problem, P (si|g) is the MDP like-
lihood of a subgoal sequence. Because this is a non-
conjugate distribution, we cannot integrate this equa-
tion analytically. If the environment is small, we can
enumerate all of g, and compute it directly as in the
previous section. In large environments we must use an
approximate method to choose a new table; some tech-
niques are described by (Neal 2000). In the parameter
re-assignment step, we draw the subgoal sequence from
the posterior over subgoal sequences, given all sequences
assigned to a table. Assume s1:l are the sequences as-
signed to table k. The distribution to draw a new sub-
goal sequence g for table k should be P (g|s1:l). This
probability for each subgoal sequence can be calculated
as follows:
P (g|s1:l) ∝ P0(g)P (s1:l|g) = P0(g)
l∏
i=1
P (si|g) (3)
At the end of each step of the loop, we count the
number of subgoal sequences for each state sequence.
We represent the number of times that g is assigned
any state sequence as c(g). The normalized count cor-
responds to P (g ∈ g1:K |s1:N ).
Algorithm 1 Subgoal inference
for i = 1 to N do
zi = i; gi ∼ P (gi|si) // Initialize Step (See, Eq. 1)
end for
for r = 1 to repeat do
for i = 1 to N do
zi ∼ P (zi|z−i, si) // Table Re-assign Step (See,
Eq. 2)
if zi is index for new table then
gzi ∼ P (gzi |si) // Parameter Initialize for
new table (See, Eq. 1)
end if
end for
for k ∈ {z1, z2, ...} do
gk ∼ P (gk|{si|1 ≤ i ≤ N, zi = k}) // Parame-
ter Re-assign Step (See, 3)
end for
for k ∈ {z1, z2, ...} do
c(gk)← c(gk) + 1
end for
end for
for all {g|c(g) > 0} do
P (g ∈ g1:K |s1:N )← c(g)/(repeat)
end for
output P (g ∈ g1:K |s1:N )
Experiments
Our two experiments presented a “warehouse” scenario
involving the delivery of various items to destinations
in the environment shown in Fig. 2. The warehouse has
three delivery destinations: A, B, and C. There are nine
potential items to be delivered, marked by numbers 1-
9. The items are arranged into three rows, and for each
delivery, one item can be delivered from each row.
Each job in the warehouse has a specific destination,
and several possible “item lists” to deliver. An item list
consists of either one, two, three items that must be
delivered to the destination. For each delivery, one of
these item lists is selected by the warehouse scheduler.
In addition to items from the current item list, work-
ers are encouraged to pick up “Add-on” items , but
only if this won’t increase the number of steps on their
path to the destination. For example, if the item list
for Fig. 2(b) is [2,8], item 5 is a good Add-on item for
that delivery, because item 5 is the only additional item
that does not require additional steps to obtain, given
the start point, item list, and destination. There is a di-
rect correspondence between delivery destinations and
item lists in this setting and destinations and subgoals
as represented by our model.
(a) Warehouse
environment
8
1
9
2 3
4 5 6
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(b) Example
sequence
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(c) Worker-Helper
environment
8
1
9
2 3
4 5 6
7
CA B
Figure 2: (a) Experimental scenario. A, B, and C mark
possible destinations, and numbers 1-9 mark items that
workers must deliver. Red points mark potential start-
ing locations.(b) Example agent behavior. (c) Environ-
ment of Experiment 2. Green point is the starting loca-
tion of the Helper.
Experiment 1: Subgoal inference
Participants We recruited participants for this study
using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were 29
adults located in the USA (Male 13, Female 14, Un-
known 2). Mean age was 32 years old.
Procedure First, in a training phase, subjects
learned to perform an example warehouse job to learn
the rules of the scenario. In each trial of the testing
phase, participants saw 8 paths for a particular job, and
inferred how many item lists the job had, and which
items were on each list.
Stimuli We prepared 22 jobs for the testing phase,
including a range of subgoal structures of varying com-
plexity and difficulty. First were jobs with one item list,
involving 1, 2, or 3 subgoals. Second were jobs with two
item lists, involving 1, 2, or 3 subgoals for both item
lists, or 1 and 3 subgoals for each item list, respectively.
Some jobs presented two types of action sequences. In
one type, the action sequence could reach all subgoals
without deviating from the shortest path to the desti-
nation. These cases were difficult in that they did not
provide direct evidence for any subgoal. In the other
type, the action had to make a detour to reach the sub-
goal, which provided stronger evidence for that subgoal.
Modeling In our MDP representation of the environ-
ment, S corresponds to the agent location, and A is the
set of movements (up, left, and right). We used a uni-
form distribution for the prior over subgoal sequences
P0(g) and set β = 6. For the nonparametric Bayesian
model, we set the concentration parameter α0 = 0.015.
We used 5,000 iterations of Gibbs sampling, with 1,000
steps burn-in time to reach the stationary distribution.
Alternative models We prepared 3 alternative
models to compare with our Bayesian nonparamet-
ric model: Independent model, Logical possibility model,
and Copy model. To explain each alternative model, we
consider the case in which the model observes N se-
quences s1:N .
The Independent model is most similar to our ap-
proach. The only difference is that this model does not
use the CRP, but instead calculates the posterior for
each sequence P (gi|si) independently. The joint prob-
ability for all sequences is given by: P (g1:N |s1:N ) =∏N
i=1 P (gi|si). The marginal probability for each sub-
goal sequence is given by: P (g ∈ g1:N |s1:N ) =∑
{g1:N |g∈g1:N} P (g1:N |s1:N ).
The Logical possibility model is a more heuristic ap-
proach, which computes the proportion of observations
in which a subgoal sequence is present within the ac-
tion sequence. Formally, P (g ∈ g1:K |s1:N ) = |{i|1 ≤
i ≤ N ∧ g ⊂ si}|/N .
The Copy model is the simplest alternative, but per-
haps the most intuitive. It assigns probability 1 to the
subgoals which have the highest likelihood for each
observed sequence. In other words, the inferred sub-
goal sequence is the maximal subgoal sequence that is
included by an observed action sequence. If we rep-
resent such a subgoal sequence MaxSubgoal(s), the
copy model can be written: P (g ∈ g1:K |s1:N ) = 1 if
g = MaxSubgoal(si) for some i, otherwise 0.
Results To compare human behavioral results with
those of our models, we compute the proportion of
participants who selected each item list for each trial.
Model predictions were based on the marginal proba-
bility that each item list generated at least one path.
Table 1 compares the correlation of the Bayesian
nonparametric subgoal model and our three alternative
models with human inferences. The Bayesian nonpara-
metric model correlates very strongly with human infer-
ences. The other models also correlate positively with
human inferences, but all are substantially worse than
the Bayesian nonparametric model.
Fig. 3 plots human inferences against the Bayesian
nonparametric model predictions for all trials and sub-
goal sequences. This shows that our model can almost
Model CRP Independent LP Copy
Correlation 0.973 0.644 0.267 0.495
Table 1: Pearson correlation between human inferences
and computational models. LP stands for “Logical Pos-
sibility”.
perfectly predict whether humans will infer that a cer-
tain item list is included in each job. For a small number
of trials, humans are somewhat uncertain whether to in-
clude a particular item list, and the model captures this
uncertainty as well.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Model Prediction
0.0
0.2
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of human inferences versus
Bayesian subgoal model predictions (r = 0.973).
Finally, we compare our model predictions with hu-
man inferences for two specific jobs. In Fig. 4(a), each
path includes item 5, but there are no paths which in-
clude only this item. Humans and the Bayesian non-
parametric model infer that [5] is the most likely sub-
goal sequence, based on the systematic deviation from
the shortest path to the destination to reach this item.
All other models fail in revealing ways, inferring more
item lists than are necessary to explain the data. In
Fig. 4(b), there are two item lists. Although every path
is an efficient route to the destination, without inferring
an item list, humans and our model can infer these two
subgoal sequences correctly by assessing the probability
that these items are selected intentionally rather than
by coincidence. Our alternative models once again fail
to capture people’s judgments.
Experiment 2: User support using subgoal
inference
Task definition We call this the Worker-Helper
Task. The main environment is the same as in Exper-
iment 1, but there are two types of agents. One type
is Worker, whose actions are structured identically to
those presented in Experiment 1. The Worker’s job re-
mains the same: to deliver an item list to a destination.
The other type is Helper, which must support Work-
(a) Results for job 2/22
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Figure 4: Example results for two jobs. (a) Job with
item list [5]; humans and CRP model infer [5] is the
most probable subgoal sequence. Alternative models fail
to predict human judgments. (b) Job with two item
lists: [1] and [3]. Humans and CRP model correctly in-
fer these two subgoal sequences. Once again, the alter-
native models fail to predict human judgments.
ers in achieving their goals. The task of the Helper is
to learn the structure of the Worker’s jobs, then use
this to help the Worker complete a job in progress by
retrieving an item from the item list of the Worker, and
delivering it to the destination. Helpers begin each trial
on the left side of the warehouse, midway between the
second row of items (4, 5 and 6) and the third row of
items (7, 8 and 9). Fig. 2(c) illustrates this task, with
the start point of the Helper marked by a green dot.
Collaboration protocol On each trial, the Worker
randomly chooses a destination (A, B, or C) and an
item list associated with that destination. The set of
item lists for each destination is fixed and known to the
Worker, but not the Helper. Next, the Worker plans a
path to achieve their goals and begins to move through
the warehouse. The Helper observes the Worker’s be-
havior and decides which target item to retrieve by
inferring the Worker’s subgoal sequence (due to the
Helper’s starting location, the target item will always
be in the third row, i.e., item 7, 8, or 9). Once the Helper
decides their target item, the Helper shows this target
to the Worker and begins to move. After the Worker
observes the Helper’s target item, the Worker re-plans
its path under the assumption that the Helper will get
the target item. After the Helper gets the target item,
the Helper moves toward the destination inferred by
observing the Worker’s path. When the Helper cannot
decide on a target item, they do nothing.
Modeling We assume that workers take the opti-
mal actions, given their subgoal sequence, i.e., at =
arg max
at
Qpi
∗
g (st, at). The Helper estimates the marginal
probability that each item is included in the subgoal
sequence which the Worker is currently following. The
Helper computes this probability based on the partial
path of the Worker s1:t, and n previously observed paths
s1:n, under the assumption that the Worker plans ap-
proximately rationally, with softmax parameter β = 2.
When the probability of a target exceeds a certain
value, the Helper decides on this item. The Worker then
re-plans by removing the target item and the Helper be-
gins to take optimal actions, as does the Worker.
Probability of target item and destina-
tion The marginal probability of target item
g′, given s1:t and s1:n is: P (g′|s1:t, s1:n) =∑
d
∑
{g|g′⊆g} P (s1:t|g, d)P (g ∈ g1:K |sd1:n), where
sd1:n is the subset of previously observed paths with
destination d. P (g ∈ g1:K |sd1:n) is calculated using
the subgoal inference method in Section 2. P (s1:t|g, d)
can be computed using Eq. 1, but without the con-
straint that dim(g) = dim(g) + 1. The marginal
probability of destination d, given s1:t and s1:n is:
P (d|s1:t, s1:n) ∝
∑
g P (s1:t|g, d)P (g ∈ g1:K |sd1:n).
Alternative models We use the same alternative
models as in Experiment 1, and a common collabora-
tion protocol (described above) for each subgoal infer-
ence model. We also add two new models. One is No
Helper, which means the Helper has no subgoal knowl-
edge. As a result, the Helper does nothing. The other
is the Ground Truth model, which means the Helper
knows the correct subgoal. It is a benchmark to mea-
sure the benefit of the Bayesian model.
Test method We tested three natural types of sub-
goal settings. In the first, each of the three destinations
has one subgoal sequence, which consists of either 7, 8,
or 9. In the second, each of the three destinations has
one subgoal sequence, which consists of either item 4,
5, or 6 and either item 7, 8, or 9. In the third, each of
the three destinations has two subgoal sequences which
consist of either item 7, 8, or 9. We generate every possi-
ble combination of items for each subgoal setting, then
we learn many subgoal structures and evaluate the per-
formance for each subgoal structure.
Evaluation for one subgoal structure We gener-
ate a number of sequences of Workers from random
start points for each destination. We then compute sub-
goal inferences for each model using the sequences. We
then execute the collaborative task 99 times for each
subgoal inference (11 points times 9 trials), and evalu-
ate the performance of Workers in achieving their des-
tination. We repeat these tests 5 times for each subgoal
structure. We use the following score to measure per-
formance. If the Worker achieves their goal, they score
100 points, but each action costs 2 points. This directly
corresponds to the MDP reward and cost settings in
Experiment 1.
Results We executed the test, varying the number
of input sequences to evaluate the dependence of each
model on the amount of input data. Fig. 5(a) shows the
average score of each model as a function of the num-
ber of input sequences. Generally, the Helper using the
nonparametric Bayesian model is more beneficial than
any alternative model. This model achieves good per-
formance (almost as high as the Ground Truth model)
using even a small number of input sequences.
Further, because the alternative models depend
highly on the input sequences, the scores of these mod-
els are unstable. Fig. 5(b) shows the average variance
of the results for each subgoal setting (we repeated the
experiment 5 times for each subgoal setting; this score
is the variance of these). None of the alternative mod-
els can provide stable user support. In contrast, the
nonparametric Bayesian model provides stable support
using even a small number of input sequences (over two
input sequences). This stability is a key factor for user
support, since unstable help can confuse and frustrate
users.
Conclusion
We presented a model of how humans infer subgoals
from observations of complex action sequences. This
model used rational hierarchical planning over sub-
goal structures generated by a nonparametric Bayesian
model to capture people’s intuitions about the structure
of intentional actions. We showed how Bayesian infer-
ence over this generative model using a novel MCMC
method predicts quantitative human subgoal inferences
with high accuracy and precision. We then showed that
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Figure 5: Model scores (a) and variance (b) as a function
of the number of input sequences. Variance of No helper
and Ground Truth is always 0.
our model is useful in practice, enhancing performance
in an application to an artificial user support task.
Our modeling and experimental scenarios are ex-
tremely simplistic in comparison with real human be-
havior. One limitation is our assumption that subgoal
sequences are chosen according to probabilities deter-
mined by the Dirichlet Process. More generally, the
probability of choosing a particular subgoal sequence
will depend on the efficiency of that subgoal sequence,
relative to the alternatives. To enhance the expressive-
ness of our model, Infinite PCFGs (Liang et al. 2007),
Adaptor Grammars (Johnson, Griffiths, and Goldwa-
ter 2007), or fragment grammars (O’Donnell 2015) are
promising extensions to the simple Dirichlet Process we
employ. These and other frameworks which can be ap-
plied to structured goal representation complement our
work here by naturally interfacing with models of hier-
archical planning analogously to the model we describe.
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